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Should a boss (a principal) delegate authority (a decision right) to
his or her subordinate (agent) if the subordinate has private informa-
tion? This paper answers this question under “imperfect commitment”
assumption that compensation schemes are contractable but decisions
are not veriﬁable. Our conclusions are that (i) the principal strictly
prefers delegation to centralization if the decision is suﬃciently impor-
tant to the principal; (ii) the principal should adopt performance-based
compensation scheme under both delegation and centralization, but
the optimal compensation schemes are quite diﬀerent; (iii) the prin-
cipal more prefers delegation to centralization in comparison with no
contract case or complete contract case.
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to reexamines whether a boss delegate author-
ity (decision right) to his or her subordinate or not if the subordinate has
private information. The existing literature has studied this question under
two diﬀerent assumptions. One approach adopts “no commitment assump-
tion,” in which the boss cannot write any contract and points out a trade-oﬀ
as follows (Alonso and Matouschek 2005, Dessein 2002, and Harris and Ra-
viv 2002, Holmstrom 1984, Jensen and Meckling 1992). On one hand, if a
boss holds authority (centralization), an ignorant boss about subordinates’
information cannot avoid to make an inappropriate decision. On the other
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1hand, if the boss delegates authority to his or her subordinate (decentral-
ization), the subordinate, who is not under control of the boss, may abuse
his authority. The answer in this approach, therefore, is that if a conﬂict of
purpose between a boss and his or her subordinate is not serious, authority
should be delegated to the subordinate. Another approach of the existing
studies are based on “complete contract assumption” in which a contract
can be written completely. Under the assumption, the revelation principle
says that it is optimal that a boss always keeps his authority (Melumad and
Shibano 1991and Harris and Raviv, 1998).
Both approaches, however, has a trouble in analyzing the relationship
between the allocation of authority and compensation scheme. The studies
under no commitment assumption explain the reason why a boss should del-
egate authority to his or her subordinate, but cannot analyze the optimal
compensation scheme from the deﬁnition of no commitment assumption.
By adopting complete commitment assumption instead, we can ﬁnd the op-
timal compensation scheme. The optimal compensation scheme under a
decentralized process, however, cannot be analyzed as it is optimal that a
boss always keeps his authority. This analytical diﬃculty is serious, for we
cannot answer the important questions for practical organization design-
ers as follows: should ﬁrms adopt diﬀerent incentive system according to
diﬀerent allocations of authority?
In order to answer this question, this paper analyzes an intermediate
circumstance between no commitment assumption and complete contract
assumption. Our model is as follows. There is a principal (a boss), and
an agent (her subordinate) who are involved in decision-making such as
choosing a project from available projects.1 Only the agent has private
information concerning with the decision, i.e. his ability to implement the
discussing project (i.e. whether marginal cost is high or low). Firstly the
agent sends a message about her private information to the principal and the
holder of authority makes a decision. A decision process is centralized if the
principal makes a decision. A decision process is decentralized or authority
is delegated to the subordinate if the agent makes a decision. After the
execution of the chosen project, the principal receives veriﬁable performance
measure about a project (a veriﬁable signal about the decision).
Our important assumption, which distinguishes our paper from the oth-
ers, is that the decision is not veriﬁable but the agent’s message and perfor-
mance about the unveriﬁable decision are veriﬁable (imperfect commitment
assumption). In other words, the principal cannot design a decision rule but
can design compensation scheme contingent on the agent’s message and the
performance. This is an intermediate assumption between the two assump-
tions in the existing literature, in that the principal can write a contract but
1According to the custom in contract theory literature, we use “she” (“he”) as a pro-
noun of a principal or a boss (an agent or a subordinate).
2the ability for contracting about decisions is limited.
By analyzing our model, we ﬁnd a new trade-oﬀ between delegation
and centralization. The existing literature considers the trade-oﬀ between
information loss by centralization and a loss of control by delegation (Dessein
2002, Holmstrom 1984, and Jensen and Meckling 1992). Our new trade-oﬀ
is between a self-commitment cost by centralization and an incentive cost by
delegation. When the decision process is centralized, the principal bears a
self-commitment cost to make the decision which is desiable before receiving
the agent’s private information, because after receiving the agent’s private
information, she tends to choose the excessive diﬃcult project. Under a
decentralized decision process, the principal bears an incentive cost to lead
the agent to make a desirable decision, because the agent prefers to choose
an easy project
The analysis of the trade-oﬀ gives us three results. Firstly, we show
that although the principal can write contract, the principal strictly prefers
delegation to centralization if the self-commitment cost outweights the in-
centive cost. Second, the principal should design a compensation scheme
contingent on performance under both delegation and centralization, but
the optimal schemes are quite diﬀerent. When authority is delegated to
the agent, the principal should oﬀer to high ability agent a compensation
more dependent on his performance than to low ability agent, as the princi-
pal wants the high ability agent to implement more diﬃcult project. Under
centralization, the principal uses a performance-based compensation scheme
to low ability agent as the principal should refrain to choose excessive dif-
ﬁcult project. The scheme under centralization corresponds with overtime
pay and substitute holiday in a real world, while the scheme under decen-
tralization corresponds with the performance-based payment. Finally, we
ﬁnd a new beneﬁt of delegation in that the principal sometimes bears no
incentive cost when authority is delegated to the agent, because (i) the high
ability agent more tolerates a risk (the movement in compensation) than the
low ability agent, as the high ability agent has information rent like a stan-
dard adverse selection model; (ii) under delegation, performance-contingent
compensation is paid to the high ability agent. When the decision process
is centralized, the principal pays performance-based compensation to the
low ability agent who has less information rent. These provide a beneﬁt of
delegation.
While most studies, except for the papers cited, above deals with no-
information side of delegation (Aghion and Tirole, 1997, Baliga and Sjostrom,
1998, Baker et al., 1999, Bolton and Farrell (1990), Athey and Roberts 2001),
our model is closely related to Krishna and Morgan (2005) and Ottaviani
(2000). They also examine the optimality of delegation under assumption
that the decision is not veriﬁable and compensation is feasible. Their papers,
however, is diﬀerent from ours in that (i) the ability of the principal to con-
tract is more limited: the contract is contingent only on the agent’s message;
3(ii) they implicitly assume incentive systems in organizations (the agent’s
utility function is single-peaked). As the result, they analyze a diﬀerent
trade-oﬀ from this paper’s.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops
our model. In section 3, we compute complete contract case and no contract
case as a benchmark. Section 4 analyzes delegation and centralization is
analyzed in section 5. In section 6, both cases are compared. Section 7
provides some concluding remarks.
2 Framework
We consider a principal (a boss) and an agent (a subordinate) who have to
make a decision x within available decisions X = fxH;xLg (∆x = xH¡xL >
0) such as setting the subordinate’s goal or choosing a project from available
projects. When a decision x is executed, the principal obtains vP(x) (∆vP =
vP(xH)¡vP(xL) > 0) and the agent bears cost vA(x;µ) = ¡µx such as some
cost to acheive the goal or implement the project. µ 2 Θ = fµ0;µ1g is the
random variable which represents the nature of the decisions such as the
marginal cost of the goal or the diﬃculty of the projects (∆µ = µ1 ¡µ0 > 0)
and whose density function is f(µ). For convenience, we denote f = f(µH)
and 1 ¡ f = f(µL). Only the agent is informed about the nature µ.
The execution of the decision also generates a noisy signal (y 2 Y =
fG;Bg) about the decision. The probability on y when a decision x is
executed, is denoted by g(y;x). Let ∆g = g(G;xH) ¡ g(G;xL) > 0. We
assume that y is independent of µ. Examples of y involve performance in
choosing a project x, work time under management by objectives, and so on.
To avoid unessential classiﬁcation, we assume that g(G;xH) > g(G;xL) ¸
1=2 and µ1 ¸ (f + 1)µ0.
The decision-making process has two stages: (i) the agent sends a mes-
sage, m 2 M, about private information to the principal; (ii) after the mes-
sage is sent, either the principal or the agent who has control right chooses
x. Authority is delegated to the agent (a decision process is decentralized) if
the subordinate chooses x. A decision process is centralized if the principal
chooses x.
The principal can design a contract but the principal’s ability to write
the contract is limited. We use the following terminology of the principal’s
ability to commit in this paper. The ability is called “complete” if message
m, signals y and decision x are veriﬁable, while “no ability to commit”
means that neither message m, signals y nor decision x is veriﬁable. We
call the ability imperfect if message m and y are veriﬁable while µ and x are
not veriﬁable. The imperfect commitment assumption reﬂects the situations
where ﬁrms can design compensation scheme but cannot design the decision
rule. We therefore adopt the imperfect assumption in most of this paper,
4message (m) performance (y) decision (x)
Complete Commitment V V V
Imperfect Commitment V V Not V
No Commitment Not V Not V Not V
Table 1: Deﬁntion of complete, imperfect, no commitment assumptions
(“V” stands for “Veriﬁable” )
while the complete commitment assumption and no commitment assumption
are treated as benchmarks.2Under the imperfect commitment assumption,
the principal designs a compensation scheme contingent on m and a signal
y, i.e., w(y;m).
When µ and y are generated, the utilities of the principal and the agent
are given by
UP(x;w;µ;y) = vP(x) ¡ w(m;y); (1)
UA(x;w;µ;y) = vA(x;µ) + w(m;y): (2)


















The timing of the game is given as follows.
1. The principal allocates the control right.
2. The agent privately observes µ.
2Together with the imperfect commitment assumption, we implicitly assume that the
decision right X is transferred contractably. One might have the question why the decision
set X is contractable while elements in the decision set are not veriﬁable, in paticularwhy
the principal does not turn over the authority when delegating it to the agent. The answer
is that if the delegation is ex ante beneﬁcial for the principal, the principal can honor the
delegation of authority by utilizing the following procedure: (i) the principal does not
observing the decision (e. g., increasing the physical distance between the principal and
the agent, or not introducing the monitor institution); (ii) at the same time the agent
sends message and implements the decision. Under the procedure, the principal cares her
ex ante payoﬀ whenever the turn-over of authority is feasible and thus keeps the promise.
53. The principal oﬀers a contract fw(m;y)g.
4. The agent accepts or rejects the contract.
5. The agent sends a message m 2 M.
6. The principal or the agent makes a decision.
7. y is observed and the contract is executed.
3 Benchmarks
In this section, we establish two benchmark results under the complete com-
mitment assumption and the no commitment assumption.
A Benchmark under the Complete Commitment Assumption We
begin with the analysis under the complete commitment assumption that
x, m, and y is veriﬁable. Let h(m;y) = (x(m);w(m;y)) be an allocation
when m is sent and y is observed. The principal’s problem is to choose a
mechanism H = fh(m;y) j m;yg to maximizes her expected utility. In this
case, the problem is substantially equivalent to a standard adverse selection
problem.3 Although the model diﬀers from the standard adverse selection
model in that a signal y is veriﬁable, the use of y does not improve the
principal’s utility as y is only a noisy signal of x and x is veriﬁable. As
the standard model, we make the following assumptions without loss of
generality; (i) M = Θ; (ii) w(µ;G) = w(µ;B), and x(µ;G) = x(µ;B) for any
µ.
Furthermore, it is (weakly) optimal that the decision right belongs to
the principal because revelation principle implies that the principal’s payoﬀ
when the authority is delegated to the agent is always realized when the





s.t. Ey[UA(h(µi;y);µi;y)] ¸ 0 for any µi; (PCi)
Ey[UA(h(µi;y);µi;y)] ¸ Ey[UA(h(µj;y);µi;y)] for any µi;µj;
(ICi)
UA(h(µi;y);µi;y) ¸ 0 for any µi;y:
(LLCiy)
3See contract theory textbooks such as Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), Itoh (2003) or
Laﬀont and Martimort (2002).
6The participation constraint (PCi) implies that i-type agent must obtain at
least his reservation utility, which we normalize to zero. The limited liabil-
ity constraint (LLCiy) comes from the fact that i-type agent can leave the
contract after observing y. The incentive compatibility constraint (ICi) is
imposed on the problem in order to guarantee that i-type agent reports the
truth. By the standard procedure, the constraints in the problem are re-
duced to the binding (PC1), the binding (IC0), and the so-called monotonic
condition, i.e.,
w(µ1;y) ¡ µ1x(µ1) = 0; (PC1’)
w(µ0;y) ¡ w(µ1;y) = µ0(x(µ0) ¡ x(µ1)); (IC0’)
x(µ0;y) ¸ x(µ1;y): (M)
Before driving an optimal mechanism, we consider an optimal compen-
sation scheme, w(µ;y), given the decisions (x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xH;xL). In this
case, the principal utilizes the agent’s private information to make a decision
but cannot avoid to bear so-called information rent. The reason is repre-
sented in Figure 1. If µ is veriﬁable, the optimal compensation scheme is
w(µ0;G) = w(µ0;B) = µ0xH and w(µ1;G) = w(µ1;B) = µ1xL. The princi-
pal’s expected payoﬀ is f(vp(xH) ¡ µ0xH) + (1 ¡ f)(vp(xL) ¡ µ1xL). When
µ is not veriﬁable, the scheme is not incentive compatible, as the µ0-type
agent obtains a rent ∆µxL by reporting the false type µ1 (Region B), i.e.,
the scheme violates (IC0’). To keep the agent’s truth-telling, the principal
must increases by ∆µxL the compensation to the µ0-type agent (Region A)
and thus bears information rent (f∆µxL)
Lemma 1. Suppose that the ability to commit is complete and the principal’s
decision is (x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xH;xL). An optimal compensation scheme is
(w(µ0;y);w(µ1;y)) = (µ0xH +∆µxL;µ1xL) for any y. The principal’s payoﬀ
are given by
Ey;µi[UP(h¤(µi;y);µi;y)]
= f(vp(xH) ¡ µ0xH ¡ ∆µxL) + (1 ¡ f)(vp(xL) ¡ µ1xL) ´ ¼¤
HL:
When the principal freely chooses a decision pair (x(µ0);x(µ1)), (xH;xL)
is not always optimal, for diﬀerently from the standard model, we restrict the
available decision set X to a binary set fxH;xLg. The principal’s optimal
payoﬀ and an optimal mechanism, H¤, is shown in the following proposition.





















Figure 1: The Benchmark Case
1. ∆vp > k1
(x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xH;xH);w(µ;y) = µ1xH for any µ;y
Ey;µi[UP(h¤(µi;y);µi;y)] = vp(xH) ¡ µ1xH ´ ¼¤
HH
2. k1 ¸ ∆vp ¸ k2
(x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xH;xL);
(w(µ0;y);w(µ1;y)) = (µ0xH + ∆µxL;µ1xL) for any y
Ey;µi[UP(h¤(µi;y);µi;y)]
= f(vp(xH) ¡ µ0xH ¡ ∆µxL) + (1 ¡ f)(vp(xL) ¡ µ1xL) ´ ¼¤
HL
3. k2 > ∆vp
(x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xL;xL);w(µ;y) = µ1xL for any µ;y
Ey;µi[UP(h¤(µi;y);µi;y)] = vp(xL) ¡ µ1xL ´ ¼¤
HH
Proof. See contract theory textbook, e.g. Bolton and Dewatripont (2005),
Laﬀont and Martimort (2002) and Itoh (2003).
A Benchmark under the No Commitment Assumption In this case,
the holder of authority makes a decision to maximize his or her interim
payoﬀ, as x is not veriﬁable. When the principal keeps authority, she max-
imizes vP(x) subject to (PC1) and (PC2). As the result, the principal
8always chooses xH and pays µ1xH to the agent. The principal’s payoﬀ is
vp(xH) ¡ µ1xH.4
If authority is delegated to the agent, the agent always chooses xL and
the principal pays a compensation µ1xL. The principal’s payoﬀ is v(xL) ¡
µ1xL. Therefore we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Alonso and Matouschek 2005, Dessein 2002, Holmstrom
1984, Jensen and Meckling 1992). Suppose that the principal cannot write
any contract. If ∆vp < µ1∆x, delegation is strictly preferred to centraliza-
tion. Otherwise, the principal prefers centralization.
Proof. Straightforward.
4 Imperfect Commitment Case: Centralization
We next assume that x is unveriﬁable and consider a centralized case in
which the principal chooses x. In that case, the principal chooses x to
maximize her payoﬀ after receiving the agent’s report (interim payoﬀ), i.e.,




where we assume that M = Θ without loss of generality.5 This implies
that the principal faces a self-commitment problem. If y is not utilized
(w(µ;G) = w(µ;B)), the principal chooses xH regardless of the agent’s re-
port, as vp(xH) > vp(xL) for any µ. In the other words, the principal tends
to choose excessively diﬃcult a goal or project. The choice, however, is not
always optimal from a perspective of ex ante payoﬀ. To implement ex ante
optimal choice x(µ), the principal should design the compensation scheme





[w(µi;G) ¡ w(µi;B)] ¸
vp(x(µi)) ¡ vp(x0)
g(G;x(µi)) ¡ g(G;x0))
for any x0 6= x(µi):
4In this setting, communication as cheap-talk game is infeasible, as the conﬂict of both
parties is suﬃciently large. In fact, the agent’s optimal report strategy is to say µL, as
telling µH implies that the principal chooses xH. So, any separating equilibrium does not
exist.
5Bester and Strausz (2001) points out that revelation principle does not hold if some
control variable can not be commited (i.e. x in our model). However, it is shown that if
X is bianary, the revelation principle holds.
9Let S be the right-hand side in the above equality when x(µi) = xH and










s.t. (PCi), (ICi), (LLCiy), and (SCCi).
We next show that [P-2] can be replaced by [P-2’].






s.t. Ey[UA(x(µ0);w(µ0;y);µ0;y)] = Ey[UA(x(µ1);w(µ1;y);µ0;y)];
(IC0’)
x(µ0) ¸ x(µ1); (M)
(LLCiy) and (SCCi):
Proof. It is easily shown that (i) (IC0) and (IC1) ! (M); (ii) (M) and
(IC0’) ! (IC0) and (IC1); (iii) (IC0) and (PC1) ! (PC0); (iv) (LLC1G)
and (LLC1B) ! (PC1). By showing an optimal H in [P-2] satisﬁes (IC0’),
we obtain the lemma.
Suppose that Ey[UA(x(µ0);w(µ0;y);µ0;y)] > Ey[UA(x(µ1);w(µ1;y);µ0;y)].
Then we obtain
Ey[UA(x(µ0);w(µ0;y);µ0;y)] > Ey[UA(x(µ1);w(µ1;y);µ0;y)]
¸ Ey[UA(x(µ1);w(µ1;y);µ1;y)] ¸ 0;
where the last inequality is obtained from (PC1). Decreasing Ey2Y [w(µ0;y)]
slightly reduces the principal’s expected payment, while relaxing (IC1) with-
out violating (PC1), (SCCi) and (LLCiy). This contradicts the assumption.
Before driving an optimal mechanism, we consider an optimal compen-
sation scheme, w(µ;y), given the decisions (x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xH;xL)
Lemma 3. Suppose that the ability of commitment is imperfect and the
principal’s decision is (x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xH;xL). An optimal compensation
scheme is
w(µ0;G) = w(µ0;B) = µ0xH + ∆µxL + g(G;xL)S; (9)
w(µ1;G) = µ1xH + S;w(µ1;B)) = µ1xL: (10)
10The principal’s payoﬀ are given by
Ey;µi[UP(hC(µi;y);µi;y)] = ¼¤
HL ¡ g(G;xL)S:
Proof. By some manipulation, (SCC1) becomes
w(µ1;G) ¡ w(µ1;B) ¸ S;
where S =
vp(xH)¡vp(xL)
g(G;xH)¡g(G;xL) > 0. Since UA(xL;w(µ1;G)) = UA(xL;w(µ1;B))+
g(G;xL)(w(µ1;G) ¡ w(µ1;B)), (LLC1B) and (SCC1) implies (LLC1G). We
can ignore (LLC1G). On the other hand, by substituting (IC0’) into the
objective function, it yields
Eµi[vp(x(µi))] + fµ0∆x ¡ w(µ1;B) ¡ [w(µ1;G) ¡ w(µ1;B)]:
This shows (i) w(µ1;B) = µ1xL is optimal; (ii) (SCC1) is binding. There-
fore, w(µ1;G) = µ1xH + S and w(µ1;B)) = µ1xL. Although there are many
w(µ0;G) and w(µ0;B) satisfying (LLC0G), (LLC0B) and (IC0’), the princi-
pal’s expected payoﬀs given by the diﬀerent scheme are same. A simple ex-
ample of the schemes is w(µ0;G) = w(µ0;B) = µ0xH+∆µxL+g(G;xL)S.
This lemma shows that the principal should oﬀer a compensation contin-
gent on y to µ1-agent when the principal adopts a centralized decision process
and wants to choose (x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xH;xL) from perspective of ex ante
payoﬀ (see Figure 2). If the principal oﬀers an optimal compensation scheme
under the complete commitment assumption, i.e., (w(µ0;y);w(µ1;y)) = (µ0xH+
∆µxL;µ1xL) for any y, the principal chooses xH if the agent’s message is µ1,
as she maximize her interim payoﬀ. To commit to choose xL, the principal
oﬀers an optimal scheme satisfying
w(µ1;y) ¡ w(µ1;y) ¸ S:
This constraint requires that the performance-based compensation scheme
is oﬀered to µ1-agent.
This self-commitment problem causes costs to the principal in two ways.
The ﬁrst one is “direct eﬀect.” To commit xL, the principal must increases
by S compensation to µ1-type agent if performance y is G, as the agent
is protected by the limited-liability constraint. The increase of w(µ1;G)
decreases the principal’s payoﬀ by (1 ¡ f)g(G;xL)S. At the same time,
the change in the compensation to µ1-type agent causes another cost to the
principal. The increase of w(µ1;G) increases µ1-type agent’s expected payoﬀ.
This means that µ0-type agent obtains more rent (Region B in Figure 2) by
sending a false message µ1. To maintain truth-telling, the payment to µ1-type
is also increased by Region A in Figure 2. The principal’s payoﬀ decreases
by fg(G;xL)S. This is “indirect eﬀect.” As the result, the principal bears
a self-commitment cost by g(G;xL)S.
The following proposition shows an optimal mechanism and the princi-
pal’s payoﬀ when the principal keeps authority.











Figure 2: The Centralized Case
Proposition 3. Suppose that the ability of commitment is imperfect. The
optimal mechanism and the principal’s payoﬀ are as follows.
1. ∆vp > k1 ¡
g(G;xL)S
1¡f





1¡f ¸ ∆vp ¸ k2
(x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xH;xL);
w(µ0;G) = w(µ0;B) = µ0xH + ∆µxL + g(G;xL)S
w(µ1;G) = µ1xH + S;w(µ1;B)) = µ1xL
Ey;µi[UP(hC(µi;y);µi;y)] = ¼¤
HL ¡ g(G;xL)S
3. k2 > ∆vp
(x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xL;xL);
w(µ;G) = µ1xL + S;w(µ;y) = µ1xL for any µ;
Ey;µi[UP(hC(µi;y);µi;y)] = ¼¤
LL ¡ g(G;xL)S
Proof. We ﬁrst compute a optimal compensation scheme given (x(µ0);x(µ1)).
By a comparison of the principal’s payoﬀs in these cases, we obtain the
proposition.
121. (x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xH;xH)
In this case, (IC0’), (SCCi) and (LLCiy) are equivalent to (SCCi),
(LLCiy) and
Ey[w(µ0;y)] = Ey[w(µ1;y)] = µ1xH: (11)
The proof is trivial. Although there are many compensation schemes
satisfying (11), and (SCCi) and (LLCiy), the diﬀerent schemes gives
the principal the same payoﬀ, i.e., vp(xH) ¡ µ1xH. A simple example
of the schemes is w(µi;y) = µ1xH for any i;y.
2. (x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xL;xL)
In this case, (IC0’) implies Ey[w(µ0;y)] = Ey[w(µ1;y)]. The objective
function therefore becomes
vp(xL) ¡ Ey[w(µ0;y)]:
As it is shown that (i) (SCC1) and (SCC2) are binding; (ii) (LLC0B)
and (LLC1B) are binding. Therefore, a optimal scheme is w(µ;G) =
µ1xL + S and w(µ;B) = µ1xL for any µ.
We remark the principal’s payoﬀ when (x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xH;xH) and
(x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xL;xL) in comparison with the result of the benchmark
under perfect commitment assumption. When the principal implements
(x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xL;xL), the payoﬀ of the principal decreases by the self-
commitment cost g(G;xL)S, as the principal utilizes the performance-based
compensation to choose xL. Similarly, the principal’s payoﬀ does not change
when the principal implements (x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xH;xH), as the principal
prefers xH even without compensation.
5 Imperfect Commitment Case: Delegation
We next consider delegation. Delegation of authority changes [P-1] in two
ways. Firstly, the principal uses the compensation scheme so that the agent
takes the decision desirable for principal. To induce the desirable decision,





g(y;x)w(µi;y) ¡ µix for µi: (DCi)
equivalnetly,
[w(µi;G) ¡ w(µi;B)] ¸
µi(x(µi) ¡ x0)
g(G;x(µi)) ¡ g(G;x0)
for any x0 6= x(µi):
13Let I0 = µ0∆x
∆g and I1 = µ1∆x
∆g . In comparision with centralization, the agent
always chooses xL if w(µ;G) = w(µ;B).
Secondly, (ICi) in the benchmark problem is more severe, as the agent
not only tells a false but also makes a decision to maximize his payoﬀ, i.e.,
Ey[UA(h(µi;y);µi;y)] ¸ max
x Ey[UA(h(µj;y);µi;y)] for any µi;µj:
(D-ICi)






s.t. (PCi), (D-ICi), (LLCiy), and (DCi).
We ﬁrstly compute an optimal compensation scheme when the principal
implements (x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xH;xL).
Proposition 4. Suppose that the ability of commitment is imperfect, author-
ity is delegated to the agent, and the principal implements (x(µ0);x(µ1)) =
(xH;xL). If ∆µxL ¸ g(G;xH)I0, the following compensation scheme is op-
timal,
w(µ0;G) = µ0xH + ∆µxL + (1 ¡ g(G;xH))I0; (12)
w(µ0;B) = µ0xH + ∆µxL ¡ g(G;xH)I0; (13)
w(µ1;G) = w(µ1;B) = µ1xL: (14)
The principal achieves the payoﬀ in the complete contract benchmark, ¼¤
HL.
Otherwise, the following compensation scheme is optimal.
w(µ0;G) = µ0xH + I0; (15)
w(µ0;B) = µ0xH; (16)
w(µ1;G) = w(µ1;B) = g(G;xL)I0 + µ0xH: (17)
Under the compensation, the principal’s payoﬀ is ¼¤
HL¡[g(G;xH)I0¡∆µxL]
Proof. See appendix.
If the principal delegates authority to the agent and want to induce
(x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xH;xL), a performance-based compensation is oﬀered to
µ0-agent, as the principal gives µ0-type agent incentive to choose xH, i.e.,
[w(µ0;G) ¡ w(µ0;B)] ¸ I0: (18)
One might think that this additional constraint brings the principal ad-
ditional cost, as the agent is protected by limited liability. However, the









Figure 3: The Delegation Case
principal’s payoﬀ does not change if ∆µxL ¸ g(G;xH)I0, for µ0-type agent
already has information rent and thus he can stand the movement in com-
pensation (See Figure 3). The principal therefore does not bear the incentive
cost to lead µ0-type agent to choose xH. Otherwise, delegation requires the
incentive cost [g(G;xH)I0 ¡ ∆µxL].
We next compute the optimal mechanism when authority is delegated
to the agent.
Proposition 5. Suppose that x is not veriﬁable and authority is delegated
to the agent. The optimal mechanism and the principal’s expected payoﬀ are
as follows. If ∆µxL ¸ g(G;xH)I0,




w(µ0;G) = w(µ1;G) = µ1xH + I1;





1¡f ¸ ∆vp ¸ k2
(x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xH;xL);
w(µ0;G) = µ0xH + ∆µxL + (1 ¡ g(G;xH))I0;
w(µ0;B) = µ0xH + ∆µxL ¡ g(G;xH)I0;
w(µ1;G) = w(µ1;B) = µ1xL;
Ey;µi[UP(hD(µi;y);µi;y)] = ¼¤
HL
3. k2 > ∆vp
w(µi;y) = µ1xL; for any i;y
Ey;µi[UP(hD(µi;y);µi;y)] = ¼¤
LL:
If ∆µxL < g(G;xH)I0,




w(µ0;G) = w(µ1;G) = µ1xH + I1;









w(µ0;G) = µ0xH + I0; w(µ0;B) = µ0xH;
w(µ1;G) = w(µ1;B) = g(G;xL)I0 + µ0xH;
Ey;µi[UP(hD(µi;y);µi;y)] = ¼¤




w(µi;y) = µ1xL; for any i;y
Ey;µi[UP(hD(µi;y);µi;y)] = ¼¤
LL:
Proof. We can easily show that the following compensation scheme is opti-
mal if the principal implements (xH;xH) or (xL;xL).
1. (xH;xH)
The following compensation scheme is optimal.
w(µ0;G) = w(µ1;G) = µ1xH + I1;
w(µ0;B) = w(µ1;B) = µ1xH:
Under the compensation, the principal’s payoﬀ is ¼¤
HH ¡ g(G;xH)I1
162. (xL;xL)
The following compensation scheme is optimal.
w(µi;y) = µ1xL; for any i;y
Under the compensation, the principal’s payoﬀ is ¼¤
LL
By a comparison of the principal’s payoﬀs in these cases, we obtain the
proposition.
We remark the principal’s payoﬀ when(x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xH;xH) and
(x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xL;xL) in comparison with the result of the benchmark
under perfect commitment assumption. When the principal implements
(x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xH;xH), the incentive constraints reduces the principal’s
payoﬀ, as the principal oﬀers the performance-based compensation to in-
duce xH. Similarly the principal’s payoﬀ does not change when the princi-
pal implements (x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xH;xH), as the agent prefers xL without
performance-based compensation.
6 Delegation v.s. Centralization
In this section, we will compare delegation with centralization if the abil-
ity of commitment is imperfect. Firstly we consider it when the principal
implements (x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xH;xL). If ∆µxL ¸ g(G;xH)I0, delegation
dominates centralization, because delegation does not cause the incentive
cost while centralization always causes the self-commitment cost g(G;xL)S
(See Proposition 4 and Lemma 3). If ∆µxL < g(G;xH)I0, the principal faces
the trade-oﬀ between the incentive cost by delegating the authority and the
self-commitment cost by keeping the authority. The diﬀerence of principal’s
payoﬀs between both decision processes is given by
(Delegation) ¡ (Centralization)
= [¼¤
HL ¡ (g(G;xH)I0 ¡ ∆µxL)] ¡ [¼¤
HL ¡ g(G;xL)S];
= ¡[g(G;xH)I0 ¡ ∆µxL] + g(G;xL)S: (19)
The ﬁrst term is the incentive cost, while the second term is the self-
commitment cost. If the self-commitment cost outweighs the incentive cost,
it is optimal that the principal delegates authority to the agent. Otherwise,
the centralized decision process is optimal.
Proposition 6. Suppose that x is not veriﬁable, and the principal imple-
ments (x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xH;xL). If ∆µxL ¸ g(G;xH)I0, delegation domi-
nates centralization. If ∆µxL < g(G;xH)I0 and g(G;xL)S ¸ (g(G;xH)I0 ¡
∆µxL), delegation dominates centralization, the principal prefers to delegat-
ing authority rather than to keeping it. Otherwise, the principal prefers to
keeping authority rather than to delegating it.
17Inequality (19) shows that the principal more prefer delegation as the
information is more important (∆µ increases). The similar result is obtained
in Dessein (2002), but the logics are diﬀerent. The reason in Dessein (2002),
is that the increases of ∆µ increases the demerit of centralization, as the
principal cannot utilize the agent’s information when a decision process is
centralized. On the other hands, the reason in our paper is that the increase
of ∆µ enhances the merit of delegation, because when the decision process
is decentralized it enlarges the agent’s capacity to stand the movement in
compensation by increasing the µ0-agent’s information rent.
Corollary 1. Suppose that x is not veriﬁable, and the principal implements
(x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xH;xL). As ∆µ inceases, the principal more prefers a
decentralized decision process to a centralized decision process.
Proposition 7. Suppose that x is not veriﬁable. If ∆µxL ¸ g(G;xH)I0 and
k1 ¸ ∆vp, then delegation dominates centralization. If ∆µxL < g(G;xH)I0




g(G;xL) g, then delegation
dominates centralization. Otherwise, centralization dominates delegation.
Proof. See appendix.
Even if ∆µxL ¸ g(G;xH)I0, the principal does not always prefers del-
egation, as (xH;xH) can be optimal. To induce (xH;xH), centralization is
always optimal, as the principal always bears incentive cost when the de-
cision process is decentralized while under the centralized decision procss
it causes no self-commitment cost. Therefore, there is the condition that
delegation is optimal, i.e. k1 < ∆vp.
If ∆µxL < g(G;xH)I0, there is two important points to determine the
threshold that the principal prefers delegation to centralization. First one
is the condition that the self-commitment cost outweighs the incentive cost,
which is given by




This determines the threshold when the principal wants to implement (xH;xL).
Second, delegation is always optimal if the principal want to induce (xL;xL)
decision, because if the decision process is decentralized, the principal bears
no incentive cost, while if the decision procss is centralized, it causes the
self-commitment cost to induce (xL;xL). The condition that the principal
wants to prefer (xL;xL) is ∆vp · k2 +
g(g;xH)I0¡∆µxL
f . These two point
determine the threshold value in which delegation is optimal.
Corollary 2. ² The principal is more likely to prefers delegation to cen-
tralization when the ability to commit is imcomplete than when the
ability to commit is complete.
18² If ∆µxL ¸ g(G;xH)I0, the principal is more likely to prefers delegation
to centralization when the ability to commit is imcomplete than when
there is no ability to commit.
² Otherwise, the principal is more likely to prefers centralization to del-
egation when the ability to commit is imcomplete than when there is
no ability to commit.
The principal more prefers delegation to centralization if x is not veri-
ﬁable than if it is veriﬁable. Certainly, both delegation and centralization
require that the principal oﬀers performance-based compensation scheme.
However, the eﬀect of the scheme is diﬀerent: while the necessity of the
principal’s self-commitment always reduces her payoﬀ under centralization,
the principal sometimes avoid additional cost if authority is delegated to the
agent. The reason is that µ0-type agent can more tolerate performance-based
compensation than µ1-type agent, since µ0-type agent obtains information
rent as standard adverse selection model. This is why delegation is more
preferable.
Furthermore, this result shows that delegation is more preferable in com-
parison to no contract case if ∆µxL ¸ g(G;xH)I0. Recall that if the principal
cannot write any contract, ∆vp · µ1∆x is condition for optimality of delega-
tion. Within ∆vp 2 (µ1∆x;k1), delegation is optimal only under imperfect
commitment.
7 Concluding Remarks
We examine the optimality of delegation under the imperfect commitment
assumption. Our conclusion is that (i) the principal strictly prefers delega-
tion to centralization if the decision is suﬃciently important to the princi-
pal; (ii) the principal should adopt performance-based compensation scheme
under both delegation and centralization, but the structure of the optimal
compensation schemes are quite diﬀerent; (iii) the principal more prefers del-
egation to centralization in comparison with no contract case or complete
contract case.
We close this paper with a discussion of some possible extensions. In
our model, we focus on the interaction between the allocation of authority
and compensation schemes. There, however, are the other incentive systems
in organization such as promotion, career concerns, and so on. How these
incentive systems aﬀect the optimal allocation of authority is an interesting
future direction for our research.
19∆w1 < I0 I0 · ∆w1 · I1
I0 · ∆w0 < I1 (xL;xL) (xH;xL)
I1 · ∆w0 (xL;xH) (xH;xH)
Table 2: 4 cases of (˜ x(µ0); ˜ x(µ1))
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. When the principal implements (x(µ0);x(µ1)) = (xH;xL), (DC0) and
(DC1) become
∆w0 ¸ I0; (20)
∆w1 · I1; (21)
where ∆w1 = w(µ1;G) ¡ w(µ1;B) and ∆w0 = w(µ0;G) ¡ w(µ0;B). As
setting ∆w1 and ∆w0 changes the optimal ˜ x in left-hand side of (D-IC).
This problem is divided into 4 cases according to ˜ x(µ). Table 2 represents
(˜ x(µ0); ˜ x(µ1)). If ∆w1 < I0 and I0 · ∆w1 < I1, (˜ x(µ0); ˜ x(µ1)) = (xL;xL).
We will compute the principal’s optimal payoﬀ in each case and obtain the
proposition by a comparison of the principal’s payoﬀs in these cases.
1. ∆w1 < I0 · ∆w0 < I1
Step 1: (D-IC0) and (D-IC1) ! (DC0)
(D-IC0) and (D-IC1) become
X










g(y;xL)w(µ1;y) + µ0∆x ¡ g(G;xH)∆w0 (24)
w(µ0;B) ·
X
g(y;xL)w(µ1;y) ¡ g(G;xL)∆w0: (25)
By subtracting (24) from (25), we obtain
µ0∆x · ∆g∆w0: (26)
This is (DC0).
20Step 2: If ∆µxL ¸ g(G;xH)I0, the principal achieves the payoﬀ in
benchmark by using the following compensation scheme.
w(µ0;G) = µ0xH + ∆µxL + (1 ¡ g(G;xH))I0; (27)
w(µ0;B) = µ0xH + ∆µxL ¡ g(G;xH)I0; (28)
w(µ1;G) = w(µ1;B) = µ1xL (29)
We can easily check that this scheme satisﬁes (I-ICi) and (LLCiy)
and the principal’s payoﬀ is ¼¤
HL. Therefore, the scheme is optimal
compensation to implement (xH;xL) as the scheme gives the principal
the same payoﬀ as that in [P-1]. ∆µxL ¸ g(G;xH)I0 is a condition to
satisfy (LLC0B).
Step 3: If ∆µxL < g(G;xH)I0, both (D-IC0) and (D-IC1) are bind-
ing.
By some manipulation, binding (D-IC0) and binding (D-IC1) is
∆w0 = I0; (30)
w(µ0;B) =
X
g(y;xL)w(µ1;y) + µ0∆x ¡ g(G;xL)I0: (31)
Suppose that ∆w0 = I0 + ²1 and w(µ0;B) =
P
g(y;xL)w(µ1;y) ¡
g(G;xL)∆w0¡²2 is solution, where ²1;²2 ¸ 0 are chosen to satisfy (D-




g(y;xL)w(µ1;y) ¡ f∆gI0 + f(g(G;xH)²1 ¡ ²2); (32)
s.t. w(µ1;y) ¡ µ1xL ¸ 0 for any y; (33)
X
g(y;xL)w(µ1;y) ¸ g(G;xL)I0 + µ0xH + ²2; (34)
∆w1 · I1: (35)
where (34) is (LLC0B), and ∆w0 = I0 implies (LLC0G). As we can
easily show that (34) is binding, the principal’s payoﬀ is
g(G;xL)I0 + µ0xH + (1 ¡ f)²2 ¡ f∆gI0 + fg(G;xH)²1 (36)
The payoﬀ is increasing with respect to ²1 and ²2. This contradicts
the optimality of ∆w0 and w(µ0;B).
6The other ²1 < 0 or ²2 < 0 cannot satisfy (D-IC0) and (D-IC1).
21Step 4: If ∆µxL < g(G;xH)I0, the following compensation scheme
is optimal.
w(µ0;G) = µ0xH + I0; (37)
w(µ0;B) = µ0xH; (38)
w(µ1;G) = w(µ1;B) = g(G;xL)I0 + µ0xH: (39)
From step 2 and step 3, we easily show that the scheme is optimal.
Under the compensation, the principal’s payoﬀ is
¼¤
HL ¡ [g(G;xH)I0 ¡ ∆µxL]: (40)
2. ∆w1 < I0 < I1 · ∆w0
(D-IC0) and (D-IC1) becomes
X
g(y;xH)w(µ0;y) ¡ µ0xH ¸
X
g(y;xL)w(µ1;y) ¡ µ0xL; (41)
X
g(y;xL)w(µ1;y) ¡ µ1xL ¸
X
g(y;xH)w(µ0;y) ¡ µ1xH: (42)
This is the same as (IC0) and (IC1). We can use the standard proce-
dure to obtain the solution. We can easily show that (i) (D-IC0) and
(D-IC1) are equivalent to binding (D-IC0) (ii) ∆w0 = I1.
min f[w(µ1;B) + g(G;xL)∆w1 + µ0∆x] (43)
+ (1 ¡ f)[w(µ1;B) + g(G;xL)∆w1] (44)
s.t. ∆w0 = I1 (45)
∆w1 < I0 (46)
w(µ1;B) + g(G;xL)∆w1 ¡ g(G;xH)∆w0 + µ0∆x ¸ µ0xH;
(47)
w(µ1;B) ¸ µ1xL; (48)
w(µ1;B) + g(G;xL)∆w1 ¸ µ1xL; (49)
Therefore, the optimal compensation scheme is given as follows. If
∆µxL ¸ g(G;xH)I1, the optimal compensation scheme is
w(µ0;G) = µ0xH + ∆µxL + (1 ¡ g(G;xH))I1; (50)
w(µ0;B) = µ0xH + ∆µxL ¡ g(G;xH)I1; (51)
w(µ1;G) = w(µ1;B) = µ1xL: (52)
Under the compensation, the principal’s payoﬀ is
¼¤
HL: (53)
22If ∆µxL < g(G;xH)I1, the optimal compensation scheme is
w(µ0;G) = µ0xH + I1; (54)
w(µ0;B) = µ0xH; (55)
w(µ1;G) = w(µ1;B) = g(G;xH)I1 + µ0xL: (56)
Under the compensation, the principal’s payoﬀ is
¼¤
HL ¡ [g(G;xH)I1 ¡ ∆µxL]: (57)
3. I0 · ∆w1 · I1;I0 · ∆w0 < I1









It is shown these equalities are equivalent to w(µ0;B) = w(µ1;B). The
problem becomes
min w(µ1;B) + fg(G;xL)∆w0 + (1 ¡ f)g(G;xL)∆w1
s.t. I0 · ∆w0 < I1
I0 · ∆w1 · I1
w(µ1;B) ¸ µ1xL;
w(µ1;B) ¸ µ0xH;
We can easily show that (i) ∆w0 = ∆w1 = I0; (ii) w(µ0;B) =
w(µ1;B) = µ0xH. The principal’s payoﬀ is
¼¤
HL ¡ [g(G;xH)I0 ¡ f∆µxL] (60)
4. I0 · ∆w1 · I1;I1 · ∆w0
(D-IC0) and (D-IC1) become
X







To satisfy both conditions, it requires
X
g(y;xL)w(µ1;y) ¡ µ1∆x ¡
X
g(y;xH)w(µ1;y) ¸ 0; (63)
equivalently, ∆w1 · ¡I1. This contradicts I0 · ∆w1 which is the
condition of this case. Therefore there is no direct mechanism in this
case.
23B Proof of Proposition 7
If ∆µxL ¸ g(G;xH)I0, we can easily show the former part in the proposition.
In this appendix, we consider the situation satisfying ∆µxL < g(G;xH)I0.
We easily observe that delegation is optimal if ∆vp 2 (0;k2] because
(xL;xL) is optimal under both decentralized and centralized decision pro-
cess and the payoﬀ of the principal in decentralized decision process is equal
to the one in the benchmark under perfect commitment. Similarly, central-
ization is optimal if ∆vp 2 (k1;1).
1. ∆vp 2 (k2;k2 +
g(g;xH)I0¡∆µxL
f ]
(Centralization) ¡ (Delegation) = ¼¤






By g(G;xH) > g(G;xL) ¸ 1=2 (which implies ∆g · 1=2), f∆g ¡
g(G;xL) is negative. Therefore, delegation is optimal.







HL ¡ g(G;xL)S ¡ [¼¤


















HL ¡ (g(G;xH)I0 ¡ ∆µxL) ¡ ¼¤
HH









Therefore, centralization is optimal.
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